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Change the World by Cracking Capitalism? 
A Critical Encounter between 
John Holloway and Simon Susen
John holloway & Simon SuSen
Simon Susen: It would be useful if you could start by saying a few words about your last 
book, Crack Capitalism.1 In what context did you write it? What was the purpose of the 
book? To what extent does it differ from your previous works?
John Holloway: As I say in the first few pages, I see Crack Capitalism as being the daughter 
of Change the World Without Taking Power.2 The earlier book triggered many discussions, 
not only in the universities but also amongst activist groups. The reactions were very mixed. 
Some people just dismissed it, saying “What absolute rubbish! Of course we can’t change the 
world without taking power!”. Many others, however, said “Right, that’s fantastic―it’s just 
what we’ve been thinking all along. But how do we do it? Yes, we do not want to take power, 
but how do we change the world without taking power?”.
The new book is really an attempt to advance with this argument, by suggesting that 
the only way we can think of changing the world is by changing it interstitially, that is, 
by changing it piece by piece. Interstices should not be misinterpreted as states; rather, 
they should be conceived of as non-state spaces or moments. They should be understood 
as cracks: cracks rather than interstices, cracks rather than autonomous spaces; because 
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cracks move, cracks are unstable, cracks are constantly on the move, always opening up 
again, joining up with other cracks. Not only is this the only viable way in which we 
can make sense of radical social transformation, but, in addition, it corresponds to what 
is actually happening at the moment. Thus, we can think of a crack as being a space of 
negation and creation, refusal and creation, when we say “no, we won’t accept the logic of 
capitalist relations here in this space and this moment, we are going to do things according 
to a different logic”.
You can see this all over the place. You can see “big” examples, such as the Zapatistas 
uprising in 1995, in Chiapas, Mexico.3 And you can think of, say, “medium” examples, where 
people get together and assert “we are going to go in a different direction, we are going to 
develop a social centre, or a cooperative, or simply an area of activity where we do not follow 
the logic of capital”. Or you can see it, more generally, in everyday life, when people say “no, 
really, I’m not going to sell my soul to money”, and when, as a consequence, they decide to 
do things in a different way. So the book is really an attempt to explore this further, to reflect 
upon how we can conceive of these cracks and of their overall importance, but also, in some 
detail, upon both the difficulties and the possibilities arising from their existence.
Susen: Fair enough, but how does this view differ from the perspective put forward in your 
previous book? More specifically, in Change the World Without Taking Power, you were 
concerned with the complex ways in which power operates in our everyday lives. To what 
extent does your current conception of power, underlying the argument of Crack Capitalism, 
differ from the account of power you developed in your previous writings? It seems to me 
that your approach to power has always been inextricably linked to a critical concern with 
“the ordinary”, correct? For instance, you have been deeply suspicious of the view that 
“revolution is just about conquering the state or winning an election”, haven’t you?
Holloway: Yes, I have. We have to think of breaking the state in terms of everyday practices. 
How does this relate to the previous book? I don’t know. I always have a slight fear that I may 
end up saying the same thing over and over again. In Crack Capitalism, I have tried to take 
up, and develop, themes from my previous work. It is true that one issue remains important 
to me, namely the question of how, in our everyday lives, we can break with the logic of 
capitalism and, by so doing, invent different ways of doing things within, but ultimately 
beyond, the existing system.
Susen: If you don’t mind, let’s talk about the Special Issue on Crack Capitalism, which 
has recently been published in the Journal of Classical Sociology (JCS).4 Can you say a 
few words about the idea of publishing the Special Issue in a “mainstream” journal, such as 
JCS, rather than in one of the Anglophone Marxist journals, such as Radical Philosophy or 
Historical Materialism?5
Holloway: With Marxist―or, more generally, left-wing―discussions, there is always a 
danger of getting stuck in a ghetto. I think it’s important to try and break out of that, to try 
moving into different areas, to experiment with different contexts. So when the idea came 
up―whether it was yours or mine, I think it was yours―I was delighted. I thought “Great!”, 
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fully aware of the fact that such a project poses a major challenge: it creates a broader and 
more diverse forum for discussion. In this sense, it pushes me to try to explain what I’m 
talking about... 
Susen: …to a wider audience?
Holloway: Yes, to a wider audience.
Susen: Do you think that the way your work is perceived in Britain is different from the ways 
in which it is interpreted and used in, say, Australia, North America, or Central and South 
America? If so, do you notice these differences when you give talks and discuss your ideas 
with people in particular “national” contexts?
Holloway: I don’t really notice the difference, although I suppose one of the great things 
about moving to Latin America was the feeling that my ideas found a much deeper and wider 
resonance. By this I mean that I could talk about what I was thinking and then receive a much 
stronger response than in Europe. Yet, I don’t want to exaggerate, because I think it has been 
growing in Europe.
Susen: What do you mean by “stronger”? Do you mean “more engaged”, “more interested”, 
“more serious”, “more in-depth”?
Holloway: Possibly “more engaged”, but also stronger in terms of numbers, and stronger 
in the sense of feeling that a lot of people were more or less on the same wave length. And 
I guess stronger in the sense that, in very big areas, many people share my view of what 
universities are, or should be, about. I mean that universities are, and should be, about 
thinking how we break the system. These assumptions do exist in Europe, but they tend to 
be more marginal.
Susen: As you probably know, the Journal of Classical Sociology tends to publish articles on 
the continuing relevance of classical sociological thought by tracing the roots of contemporary 
social theory in the writings of influential thinkers such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile 
Durkheim, and Georg Simmel. Would you say that your work has been influenced by the so-
called “classical figures” in sociology, that is, not only by Marx but also by Weber, Durkheim, 
and Simmel?
Holloway: Not consciously, although I’m sure these scholars have influenced my work―for 
instance, in the sense that Weber influenced Lukács, and Lukács has obviously influenced me, 
but not in the sense of any conscious or direct relation between these “classical sociologists” 
and myself. 
Susen: What strikes me when reading your books and articles is that the thinkers who have 
had the most significant impact upon your work are scholars such as Karl Marx, György 
Lukács, Ernst Bloch, and Theodor W. Adorno. Is that right?
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Holloway: Yes, they are the key figures in my work.
Susen: Talking about Adorno, what do you make of recent developments in critical theory? 
For example, if you consider the works of influential thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and 
Axel Honneth, how would you assess their contributions?
Holloway: I think I don’t find them particularly interesting.
Susen: So are you of the opinion that, at least in relation to your own work, their contributions 
are not really worth engaging with?
Holloway: I guess that’s right.
Susen: OK, fair enough. In Crack Capitalism, you emphasize the importance of agenda-
setting in general and of autonomous agenda-setting in particular. Am I right to assume that 
you suggest that one of the most fatal mistakes of the political left, including the radical left, 
has been to follow the agendas dictated by capital? If so, can you elaborate on this point? 
Why do you think it is crucial that the left takes on the challenge of setting its own agenda?
Holloway: There is always the danger that the left ends up simply reacting to capital. This 
pattern of reaction, however, locks us into the existing system. Thus, we have to break this 
agenda by saying “we can create a different world, and we are going to create a different 
world, so let them chase after us”. In fact, it seems to me that this is what happens: capital is 
a constant process of trying to chase after us, of trying to appropriate our creativity, of trying 
to co-opt our revolts. We should be conscious of this process and, hence, of the fact that we 
are the people who shape the world.
Susen: Another aspect that strikes me about your last book is that it stresses the sociological 
importance of “the ordinary”, which is a dimension upon which we touched at the beginning 
of this interview. The emphasis you put on the ontological significance of ordinary social life 
reminds me of some key concerns examined by the French sociologist Luc Boltanski, who, 
on a number of occasions, has insisted that “il faut prendre les gens au sérieux” (“we need 
to take people seriously”).6 I think it would be fair to suggest that this normative concern is 
no less important in your work than it is in Boltanski’s studies. In other words, you appear to 
share the view that it is vital to take people seriously and, in this sense, recognize that they 
are, at least potentially, autonomous and critical entities, rather than―largely heteronomous 
and unreflective―cultural dupes, who do not really know, let alone understand, what is 
going on in the world. On this account, the traditional divide between scientists and experts, 
on the one hand, and laypersons and ordinary people, on the other, describes a somewhat 
dangerous epistemological “division of labour”. Would you nevertheless accept that the kind 
of knowledge you produce as a researcher―that is, as a critical sociologist, critical theorist, 
or university professor―is somewhat different from the kind of knowledge that we use in our 
everyday interactions? Or are you implying that there are no epistemological distinctions to 
be drawn between specific types of knowledge production? To my mind, this is not only an 
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epistemological question, but also a normative issue. Put differently, would you agree that 
the kind of knowledge you produce in your articles and books, as well as in your talks and 
seminars, is qualitatively different from the sort of knowledge that we generate, and draw 
upon, in our everyday interactions?
Holloway: I don’t know if it’s different. I think that what we are doing, and what we should 
be doing, is, above all, listening. Listening permits us to understand the rebellion that is 
ingrained in everyday life. Moreover, I suppose that listening is a form of intervention, rather 
than simply a mode of passive reflection. When we are listening we are trying to develop 
different themes. I guess one metaphor that springs to mind is the idea of playing jazz. By this 
I mean something which we are doing all the time: namely, taking our themes from everyday 
rebellion. And we try to magnify it, develop it, and possibly render it more coherent, in order 
to give it more force in one way or another. In any case, I see it in that way, rather than in 
terms of a clear-cut separation between one and the other.
Susen: Do you agree with Marx’s dictum that there would be no point in producing scientific 
knowledge if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided? Or do you 
disagree with this view? Or, perhaps, you think that it’s just an orthodox misreading of Marx 
to assume that we should privilege science over common sense…
Holloway: I think it’s an orthodox misreading. It seems to me that, for Marx, the important 
thing is to break the fetishized appearances generated by capitalism. The breaking of these 
fetishized appearances is based not only on a process of critical reflection, but also on a 
process of experience. I believe he sees it in those terms. Hence, his critique is, above all, 
a critique of those who create conceptual systems on the basis of fetishized appearances. 
That’s what critical science is all about. I don’t think, however, Marx suggests that “people 
are lost completely in these fetishized ways”. Not at all!
Susen: Thus, the way in which you read him does not have anything to do with the famous 
“false consciousness” thesis.
Holloway: That’s correct.
Susen: Talking about “people”, in your book you defend the notion that the “human world” 
is fundamentally different from what we may refer to as the “natural world” or the “physical 
world”. In relation to this point, you endorse the assumption that there is something distinctive 
about humanity, that is, something distinctive about human actors. What, however, do 
you reply to those who maintain that the boundaries between “the human” and “the non-
human” are increasingly blurred? For example, Bruno Latour―who, as you know, has had 
a considerable impact on recent developments in the philosophy of science―contends that 
we should abandon traditional conceptual oppositions, such as “the human” versus “the non-
human” or “the cultural” versus “the natural”. These antinomies appear to have come under 
attack for good reason. What would you say to scholars such as Latour? Would you insist 
that you still want to draw these “classical” distinctions? Do you advocate the―arguably 
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anthropocentric―view that there is something distinctive or unique about the human species, 
something which makes us “special”?
Holloway: I think we have to continue to draw this distinction in the sense that we have 
to assume our own responsibility as human beings. If the world is in danger, if life―that 
is, not just human life, but also animal life―is in danger, this is because of human activity, 
not because of pigs or because of horses. And we are the ones who have to reflect upon 
and change the situation. If we are talking about radical change, if we are talking about 
revolution, we need to draw a distinction between humans and cows. I don’t think cows are 
likely to bring about some radical social transformation. It’s really up to us. 
Susen: Would you nonetheless be willing to accept that human beings have more in common 
with animals than most intellectuals, particularly those influenced by the Enlightenment, 
used to think?
Holloway: Yes.
Susen: Let’s take the example of culture. Arguably, the so-called Geistes- and 
Kulturwissenschaften are based on the assumption that culture is a distinctively human 
characteristic. Now we know, however, that some animals also develop a sense of culture, 
because, in some cases, the same animal species can develop different life forms in different 
environments. In short, some non-human life forms appear to contain some culturally 
variable―that is, habitualized and context-dependent―behavioural patterns.
Holloway: Sure, I am quite happy with this argument. The problem, however, is how we, as 
human beings, transform culture. We may assume that ants have some sort of culture, but I 
have never heard of ants rising up against their Queen!
Susen: Fair enough.
Holloway: …whereas I think we do. 
Susen: By the way, just out of interest: what do you make of animal rights movements?
Holloway: I think one of the disasters of capitalism is that it leads to the massacre of non-
human forms of life, that is, to the absolutely dreadful massacre of other species. I believe that 
we have to stop this and that we have to stop all this for our own sake, because our environment 
is the basis of our own life. I suppose we have to stop all this, for the sake of both human and 
non-human forms of life. It is, however, our responsibility, our responsibility as humans.
Susen: Are you implying that the systematic destruction of our natural environment is 
due to capitalism, rather than due to industrialism? So-called socialist countries have also 
contributed significantly to the destruction of the planet. Of course, you may contend that 
they are, or were, not really “socialist”, but…
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Holloway: …exactly, I would say they are, or were, not really “socialist”. Anyway, I 
think capitalism, rather than industrialism, is the main problem. To say it’s all due to the 
rise of industrialism doesn’t tell you anything about the frenetic and uncontrolled dynamic 
of the capitalist system. One can imagine a different sort of social organization, in which 
people decide they still want to have some sort of industry. That wouldn’t necessarily have 
to be terribly destructive. It is in capitalism where you are confronted with this kind of 
frenetic dynamic, which nobody controls and which is absolutely destructive of the natural 
environment.
Susen: There is another aspect which I find interesting about your book: your critical engagement 
with the nature of power. In this regard, you draw a distinction between “organization” and 
“institutionalization”. Are you suggesting that institutions and institutionalization processes 
are, by definition, repressive and reactionary, and hence something to be rejected?
Holloway: One of the criticisms made of Change the World Without Taking Power is that 
it is opposed to the idea of organization. That’s not true at all. I think that organization is 
very important, since we cannot achieve very much unless we organize, unless we do things 
collectively. Institutionalization, however, is the freezing of organization, the point at which 
it becomes rigid, that is, the point at which it degenerates into formal structures or inflexible 
habits. In such a scenario, you inevitably begin to constrict the force of social doing, and 
people begin to develop a distinction between “the leaders” and “the masses”. To my mind, 
institutionalization is always something that curbs the force of human creativity, of human 
doing.
Susen: Talking about “human creativity” and “human doing”, it seems to me that another 
issue worth discussing is the fact that one of the secrets underlying the relative success 
of the contemporary capitalist system is that, ironically, it appears to be capable of re-
appropriating the purposive, cooperative, and creative dimensions of “human doing”7 in 
order to ensure its own existence. Would you concede that this is one of the key ingredients of 
its success? Once again, Boltanski’s work seems to be useful in this respect, notably his and 
Ève Chiapello’s influential study The New Spirit of Capitalism.8 As the two French scholars 
convincingly demonstrate, one constitutive element of this “new spirit” of capitalism is its 
capacity to keep going by re-appropriating―or, if you prefer, exploiting―the purposive, 
cooperative, and creative dimensions inherent in meaningful ways of “doing”. Are you 
suggesting that, even when an economic system succeeds in achieving this, there is still 
some sort of emancipatory potential inherent in this “doing capacity”, despite the fact that 
it is colonized by capitalism?
Holloway: Yes, I think so―absolutely. The contradiction is always there. The way in which 
I examine this issue in the book is by taking up the Marxist notion of the dual nature of 
labour: “abstract labour” and “concrete labour”. What happens under capitalism is that 
our activity is subordinated, channelled into a form which integrates everything into the 
totality of capital accumulation. Yet, even within this system, concrete labour is never 
totally subordinated to the logic of abstract labour. If it were, then there would be no point 
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in criticizing. In fact, if it were, then we would not be able to criticize. The fact that we can 
criticize indicates that there is something that does not fit in, that is, it implies that there is 
something that is misfitting. We may suggest that we are misfits because we are privileged 
intellectuals, in which case we effectively endorse an elitist position. On this account, 
since we work at universities, we have the privilege of not fitting in, a privilege which, 
supposedly, the masses do not have. I refuse to accept this view, because I think that we, as 
intellectuals, are not particularly special. If we are both conscious and critical of not fitting 
in, this is because we are part of the world’s population, that is, of those who do not fit in. 
This experience of misfitting is a constitutive element of capitalist society. If we did fit in 
completely and were completely dominated by abstract labour and capitalist reproduction, 
then we would no longer be human. 
Susen: What do you reply to those who challenge your explanation by asserting, for example, 
the following: “Well, actually, I do like my job. I really like what I’m doing. I don’t feel 
alienated at all. I don’t think I am being dominated by abstract labour.”―What do you say to 
them?
Holloway: It’s contradictory, isn’t it? Actually, I like my job too! I enjoy teaching, I enjoy 
doing research, but it remains contradictory. There are aspects of my job which I detest. I 
think that, once you actually talk to people, you will find that this is probably true, to different 
degrees, of everybody. Yet, the view that we should all hate our jobs is complete nonsense, 
because part of what we perform as labour is concrete labour, as an experience which makes 
sense for us, as a meaningful activity. Not always, but in many cases it does…
Susen: When using words such as “meaning” and “meaningful activity”, what do you have 
in mind? I have struggled with the concept of “meaning” for a long time. My students often 
ask me “What do you mean by ‘meaning’?”. And I respond “Well, to be honest, I find it very 
difficult to define!”. Now, what do you mean by “meaning”?. “Purpose”? Something we 
“project” upon the world? Something which is “inherent” in human life forms? 
Holloway: Yes, some sort of purpose, but it’s also something we need to think of negatively, 
in terms of action against meaninglessness. Most of us have experiences which strike us as 
being meaningless, especially those which are imposed upon us in some way. In this sense, it 
is a struggle against meaninglessness, that is, a struggle and a search for meaning. 
Susen: Would you accept that, in your work, there is a danger of reducing the experience 
of meaninglessness to an exogenously triggered reality, that is, to an unsatisfactory and 
disempowering involvement in the world caused by the systemic forces of capitalist society? If 
so, should we not accept that, inevitably, in any kind of society―that is, even in emancipatory 
life forms―there will be situations in which we experience meaninglessness and in which we 
have the feeling that what we do does not make sense? I suppose the point I am making is that 
it would be erroneous to reduce the experience of meaninglessness to a subjective occurrence 
caused by external systemic forces. Would you accept this? I guess, in this case, I am asking 
you an existentialist question!
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Holloway: Yes, I would accept this. The idea of complete meaningfulness is perhaps an 
illusion...I can’t imagine the “perfect society”!
Susen: Anyway, you are not aiming for the construction of a “perfect society”, are you?
Holloway: No. Emancipation is a social process. If, for instance, we think in terms of 
“communism”, we cannot assume everything will be perfect. Rather, we need to understand 
that we are dealing with a constant process of “communizing”. This communizing process, as 
I understand it, will always be, in some sense, a struggle against meaninglessness.
Susen: Talking about “communizing”, your work is associated with labels such as “open 
Marxism” and “autonomous Marxism”. Some people refer to it, somewhat pejoratively, as 
“subjectivist Marxism” or “warm Marxism”. Let us, however, stick with “open Marxism” or 
“autonomous Marxism”. I would like to ask you two questions in this regard. First, what are 
the key differences between “open Marxism” and “orthodox Marxism”? And, second, what 
are the main differences between your work and the writings of other contemporary Marxist 
scholars such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri?
Holloway: Well, the concept of “open Marxism” emerged way back when we were trying to 
develop something slightly different during my time at the University of Edinburgh…
Susen: …with Werner Bonefeld and Richard Gunn?
Holloway: Yes, we began to think of this being an “Edinburgh Marxism”. Then, Werner and 
Richard, together with Kosmas Psychopedis, co-edited the three-volume collection on “open 
Marxism”.9 In fact, it was they who came up with the term “open Marxism”. To my mind, the 
concept of “open Marxism” refers to the idea that critique is the opening up of categories, 
implying that they contain a struggle or that they conceal an antagonism. If you open up the 
category of “the state”, for example, you see that the state is not just a means of domination 
but an active process of “statification”, an active process of channelling struggles into certain 
forms. You begin to understand that we are dealing with an antagonistic movement. It is 
an antagonistic movement which inevitably implies the existence of an anti-state, that is, 
the process of “anti-statification”. We talk about “open Marxism” in order to emphasize the 
importance we attach to the “opening of categories” and to understanding them as being 
self-antagonistic. If we think of “labour”, for instance, the crucial point is to conceive of it 
as a self-antagonistic category, rather than as a unitary concept. “Labour”, as I see it, is a 
category which obscures the antagonism between “concrete labour” and “abstract labour”. 
As such, it conceals the power of concrete labour and human creativity; it exists in the form 
of abstract labour, or―as Richard Gunn puts it―it exists “in the mode of being denied”10. On 
this account, “concrete labour” exists in the form of being denied. This means inevitably that 
it exists in, against, and beyond its own denial. 
Over the last few years, there have been various discussions on the nature of abstract 
labour. Yet, on the whole, these discussions are too focused on abstract labour. As a 
consequence, they do not do justice to the importance of concrete labour. If, however, we 
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conceive of abstract labour as a category which obscures an underlying antagonism, then 
we begin to understand one of the key functions of abstract labour: namely, to conceal the 
constant struggle between the push of our own creativity, on the one hand, and the imposition 
of systemic integration into the totality of capitalist reproduction, on the other. You begin 
to comprehend, then, that all of social life under capitalism is composed of antagonism, an 
antagonism which is concealed, but which is volcanic in the sense that there is this kind of 
eruptive force there all the time, that is, a force which is pushing against its form and breaking 
through the form. This brings us back to the cracks. This is what the cracks are: eruptions 
that break through the logic of capitalist reproduction and spill over into the creation of 
alternative forms of social activity. 
Susen: Let’s consider the second part of my question. What are the main differences between 
your work and the writings of Hardt and Negri?
Holloway: What is very important for me is the idea of turning Marxism upside down. This 
endeavour is motivated by the conviction that we must not start from domination and that, 
therefore, we must not start from capital. Rather, we have to think the world from struggle. 
To my mind, this seems to be of fundamental importance: we have to think from below. 
My criticism of Hardt and Negri―that is, our criticism of them, because it has also been 
elaborated by Bonefeld and Gunn, as well as by other contemporary Marxist theorists―is 
that they fail to take this far enough. What I have been thinking recently is that this is not just 
a question of turning the world upside down but also a question of turning it inside out. In 
other words, we need to open up the categories and understand them as self-antagonistic, as 
I have mentioned before. It seems to me, however, that Hardt and Negri fail to do this. That’s 
my main criticism regarding their approach.
Susen: Let us, in the remainder of the interview, have a closer look at the dimensions that 
I think are problematic about Crack Capitalism. Perhaps we can start by talking about the 
theme of “negativity”, or “negative dialectics”, in your book. Would you accept that some 
critics are suspicious of the fact that there appears to be a strong emphasis, possibly too 
strong an emphasis, on “negative dialectics” in your work? Obviously, you have good reason 
to be suspicious of ideological blueprints, positivist approaches, and “scientific Marxism”. 
Put differently, I think you are right to suggest that we should be critical of anyone affirming 
that they have found the solution to every problem. In connection with your emphasis 
on “negativity”, you use―or, possibly, overuse―terms such as “different”, “other”, and 
“alternative” in your book, but without specifying what this “difference”, “otherness”, or 
“alternativeness” actually stands for. Of course, you may reply that, if we seek to define the 
exact meaning of these “different”, “other”, and “alternative” forms of “doing”, then we 
fall into the trap of “positivist” or “scientific” Marxism. Would you nevertheless admit that, 
given the terminological vagueness of these concepts, your insistence upon the vital role of 
negativity is problematic?
Holloway: No, I wouldn’t really. I think that we do have to think negatively. Even to pose the 
question of a different form of a social organization is to say “no” to existing forms of social 
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organization. It seems to me that this kind of “no” is the cutting edge that has to be there all 
the time. It shapes the grammar, or anti-grammar, of your thought. This, I believe, is much 
clearer in Crack Capitalism than in Change the World Without Taking Power. Negativity, as 
I see it, opens up a space for alternative creation. That’s the idea of the cracks, of the spaces 
of negation and creation. Negation gives rise to all sorts of experiments that explore the 
possibility of alternative social creations. People are trying to experiment in all sorts of ways, 
and it’s very difficult for us to judge the quality, let alone legitimacy, of these experiments. 
Certainly, we can have our own ideas, since we think and we criticize; but it doesn’t help to 
say, somewhat dogmatically, that any particular form of social experimentation is useless. We 
are dealing with open processes of experimentation.
Susen: I have noticed that some Marxist scholars, including some former colleagues of mine, 
who are less sympathetic to your work, occasionally characterize your approach as a kind 
of “left-wing romanticism”. And what they mean, I think, is that your texts are beautifully 
written, often read almost like poetry, and that you may aim to be taken seriously, first and 
foremost, by a different―perhaps non-academic―audience. Since you have spent a lot of 
time in Latin America, one may get the impression that the vocabularies―including academic 
vocabularies―which people use in “post-colonial” countries, such as Mexico, are very 
different from the vocabularies we use in Europe. Do you reckon this is the case or not? In 
particular, I am thinking of the influence the Zapatistas have had upon your work. Is there 
some truth to this?
Holloway: I’m not sure if that’s right. I don’t think it’s such a clear division. To my mind, it 
is a question of looking for new vocabularies, for trying to find different ways of expressing 
ourselves. It seems to me that this is very important indeed…
Susen: …as illustrated in your conceptions of “grammar” and “anti-grammar”?11
Holloway: Yes, exactly. Subcomandante Marcos is probably the most brilliant example that 
I can think of. In terms of people’s responses, however, I’m not sure. I wouldn’t say that the 
responses in Latin America are more favourable than the ones in Europe; I don’t actually feel 
that. With regard to the charge of “left-wing romanticism”, I don’t share this view. One of 
the lessons to be learned from twentieth-century revolutions is that revolution doesn’t work 
if you try to go half-way. It doesn’t work, for instance, if you say “we will abolish capital, 
but we will keep using money”. It doesn’t work if you say “we will get rid of capital, but 
we will keep the state, at least for the time being”. It doesn’t work if you say “we will do 
away with capital, but we will preserve hierarchical institutions”. From my perspective, the 
only realistic way of thinking about social transformation is to put it in much more radical 
terms. Admittedly, this may sound “romantic”, but it seems to me that this is actually much 
more realistic, much more realistic in the sense of taking note of what people think and feel, 
of people’s reactions against capitalism. I am referring to a kind of drive against capitalism 
which goes very deep, which touches people’s dreams, which touches ideas about how we 
relate to other people and about our sexuality, about all sorts of things. In this sense, contrary 
to your charge, this so-called “romanticism” is utterly realistic.
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Susen: Another aspect which interests me is the role of normativity in your writings. You 
mentioned earlier that you don’t think much of the theoretical contributions made by 
contemporary critical theorists such as Habermas and Honneth. As you probably know, 
however, there is a sustained concern with the concept of normativity in their works. Reflecting 
upon the concept of normativity, I guess the question that arises in relation to your work can 
be put as follows: how can you possibly defend the importance of key normative concepts―
notably “dignity”, “responsibility”, “autonomy”, and “humanity”―for the possibility of 
social struggle without providing normative foundations on which to justify the significance 
of these reference points for such a struggle? Are you of the view that the search for normative 
grounds, inevitably, leads to some sort of sterile and ahistorical “foundationalism” or late 
modern “positivism”?
Holloway: I don’t know, possibly!
Susen: Can you elaborate on this? I suppose you disagree with me on this aspect. It seems 
to me that one of the key strengths of Habermas’s work is that, in his engagement with the 
theoretical frameworks provided by early critical theorists, he points out that, for example, 
one of the main problems with Adorno’s writings is the lack of concern with the normative 
foundations of critical thought. Thus, Adorno may help us to think of the possibilities of an 
emancipatory society, based on empowering forms of “doing”, but, as Habermas contends, 
he fails to provide any kind of normative grounds on which to justify such a project. As I am 
sure you know, Habermas seeks to locate the emancipatory potential of society in language, 
that is, in our ability to reach mutual understanding by engaging in communicative action. I 
know that this is obviously not what you are trying to do. Do you think, however, that it is 
possible to defend normative concepts―such as “dignity”, “responsibility”, “autonomy”, or 
“humanity”―without providing normative foundations?
Holloway: I think any foundations have to be negative. A critical conception of dignity has to 
understand dignity as the struggle against the negation of dignity. The only concept of truth 
we can have is truth in terms of the struggle against the negation of truth. The other thing, I 
suppose, is that, at some level, you have to recognize that at the basis of all doing is some sort 
of experiential judgement. We are, we do, and we understand on the basis of our experience 
of the world. Yet, we have to conceive of this experience of the world not simply in terms of 
individual experiences, but also in terms of collective experiences. 
Susen: Do you mean in terms of shared experiences?
Holloway: Yes, in terms of shared experiences. Shared experiences, however, are not 
necessarily universally shared. That’s something on which, in a sense, we decide individually. 
I would say, for instance, that my experiential judgement of the world is that capitalism stinks, 
that it constitutes a horrific form of social organization, which is rushing us towards the self-
destruction of humanity and, in fact, the destruction of much more than just humanity. For 
me, then, “scientific” reflection must be guided by the question of how we can get out of 
this terrible situation. How do we break that dynamic? How can we create a different social 
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dynamic? How do we create a revolution (whatever this word may mean)? Hence, in some 
sense, I would say that this is the way in which I experience the world. To be sure, this 
understanding of the world is constantly being questioned, but it is also constantly being 
reinforced by what I see around me. The world in which we live is a negation of dignity and 
a negation of humanity. This means that my concept of science is necessarily negative, in the 
sense that I maintain that all scientific reflection should be oriented towards the question of 
how on earth we can get out of here, how on earth we can stop all this mad rush towards the 
self-destruction of humanity.
Susen: One of the things I noticed when reading Crack Capitalism is that, at least to my 
mind, you have a tendency to treat capitalism not only as a homogenizing system but also 
as a relatively homogeneous system, based on some sort of surreptitiously orchestrated 
Gleichschaltung12. It seems to me that this tendency is deeply problematic in the sense that it 
does not account for the fact that there are varieties of capitalism out there. In fact, not only 
do we need to acknowledge that the history of modernity is characterized by the emergence 
of varieties of capitalism, but, in addition, we need to recognize that capitalist societies are 
internally differentiated in terms of sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, age, and “ability”―to mention only a few of them. You appear to ignore, or at least 
underestimate, the sociological significance of these internal patterns of social differentiation. 
Scholars who specialize in the sociological study of one or more of these variables tend 
to agree that there does not seem to be one “foundational” factor in the construction of 
social life. For the right or the wrong reasons, this insight is often discussed in terms of 
“intersectionality”. By contrast, your writings―including your most recent ones―are marked 
by a tendency to reduce all social phenomena to “class”, or at least to “class struggle”. Are 
you not willing to concede that capitalist domination is only one amongst many other forms 
of domination and that, more importantly, some forms of domination do not have anything 
to do with capitalism? Furthermore, what is crucial from a sociological point of view is that, 
in specific historical situations or interactional settings, other forms of domination can have 
more of an impact upon social practices than capitalist modes of domination. What do you 
respond to critics who raise these concerns?
Holloway: I don’t conceive of capitalist society as a homogeneous system, but I do regard 
it as being homogenizing. I interpret social development as being driven by a dynamic, by a 
dynamic which is rooted in the way human activity is organized. Under capitalism, human 
activity is permeated by the subordination of concrete labour to abstract labour. I would find 
it difficult to make sense of the capitalist dynamic of destruction, for instance, in terms of 
gender…
Susen: …or in terms of ethnicity or in terms of any other sociological variable on my list.
Holloway: Yes, because this is not what I am trying to understand. What I want to stop is this 
dynamic of destruction, and this means focusing on the way human activity is organized. The 
way I understand the organization of human activity is in terms of capital, in terms of the way 
in which our individual activities are bound together through abstract labour.
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Susen: Am I right to suggest that a central presupposition you share with “orthodox Marxists” 
is the assumption that, if we want to uncover the logic underlying the large-scale destruction of 
the planet, we need to give priority to the analysis of capitalism? If I understand you correctly, 
however, your conception of “open Marxism” differs from “orthodox Marxism” in that you 
regard key sociological variables―such as class, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, and “ability”―
as irreducible and relatively autonomous, thereby recognizing that their existence manifests 
itself in interrelated, yet relatively independent, mechanisms of repression and discrimination?
Holloway: No, I would say that they are not separate. For example, where does the idea 
that there are two genders come from? Why do we divide up society between “men” and 
“women”? Why on earth? Why not divide it up according to the colour of hair, the colour of 
eyes, or whatever? Why in this gender-specific way? What I try to argue in Crack Capitalism 
is that this way of structuring society arises from the way in which our activities are organized. 
To my mind, there is no “hierarchy of contradictions”. If, however, we are going to talk 
about the possibility of changing society, then we have to look at the ways in which human 
activity is organized. This, I believe, is the central issue: the self-antagonistic organization of 
human activity. Yet, the self-antagonistic organization of human activity is not just an issue of 
economics; rather, it is a matter of what generates the dominance of nouns over verbs, what 
converts time into the dictatorship of clock time, and what leads to the idea of two sexes.
Susen: Talking about “the sexes”, why do you, in Crack Capitalism, identify the “labourer” 
with the “he” and with the “masculine”, whilst associating the “doer” with the “she” and with 
the “feminine”?13 
Holloway: I think that…
Susen: …it is more of a metaphor?
Holloway: Yes, it is a metaphor, but at the same time it is not, because, on the whole, it is true 
that abstract labour is very much tied up with male domination. The organization of labour, 
including our understanding of the organization of wage labour or of abstract labour, has 
always been completely dominated by men. I believe that, at the moment, the revolt against 
labour is a revolt in which, empirically, women play a much more important role.
Susen: On a different note, do you agree with the contention that there is a strong functionalist 
element in your work? In this respect, I think in particular of your conception of capital. As 
far as I can see, one of the main contradictions in your book is that you seem to be implying 
that capital is a sort of anonymous and uncontrollable systemic force and, at the same time, 
you portray capital as if it were a will-equipped subject capable of exercising power over us 
and “doing” things.
Holloway: I am not sure about this. There is certainly a danger with this kind of conceptual 
shorthand, which may be unhelpful. Whether this means “functionalist”…I wouldn’t have 
thought so.
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Susen: Well, I guess one of the main objectives of your writings is to make sense of the key 
functions of particular social mechanisms, structures, and institutions. Be it as it may, let us 
talk about your conceptual distinction between “labour” and “doing”. As far as I remember, 
this is a distinction that you did not draw in your previous book, Change the World Without 
Taking Power, did you?
Holloway: Not very much.
Susen: Would it be right to suggest that the conceptual differentiation between “labour” and 
“doing” is the most fundamental distinction you draw in Crack Capitalism? If so, why?
Holloway: Yes, I think so. One of the interesting things about the discussions arising from 
Change the World Without Taking Power was that I was invited to give various talks and join 
numerous meetings with different groups, who were trying to develop alternative conceptions 
of social activity. For me, one of the most striking things in this regard is the importance 
people attribute to thinking creatively about alternatives. They are dedicating themselves to 
alternative forms of activity; some of them are extremely active in a way which―for them at 
least―breaks, or seeks to break, with the logic of capitalism. They are doing this not because 
they are going to get a lot of money for it, or because they are generating an economic profit, 
but because this is something they really consider to be important. This, I believe, illustrates 
that we need to draw a distinction between two forms of activity: on the one hand, a form of 
activity which is, if you like, integrated into the system and generally remunerated by money; 
and, on the other hand, a form of activity which people are choosing and which, in some 
way, is being directed against the logic of the system and pushing beyond its dominance. 
This takes us to the Marxist distinction between “abstract labour” and “concrete labour”. I 
conceive of the latter as being our activity, which is generally subordinated by and integrated 
into the system through the former, that is, through abstraction. 
There is, however, an underlying antagonism, which potentially goes beyond capitalism. 
So that’s what I’m trying to do in theoretical terms. For me, that’s really the most important 
advance in the book: if we are opening up other categories (such as the state, money, or 
whatever), we have to reflect upon the central category of labour, and we have to open it up, 
as indeed Marx also does. We need to understand this opening up as an internal contradiction, 
as being an antagonism. In fact, we live within an antagonism, which is at the centre of 
today’s struggles; it is, if you like, at the centre of class conflict.
Susen: What do you say to those who criticize you for using the concept of “doing” not only 
as a foundational category but also as a pivotal category which, paradoxically, is remarkably 
vague?
Holloway: I think that this is precisely the problem. If we are talking of our drive towards 
a different sort of society that already exists, but exists in the form of being negated, then it 
follows that we don’t have the vocabulary to express adequately that which is suppressed, 
simply because the vocabulary is part of that which exists in the form of its negation. So it is 
true that “doing” is not a terribly satisfactory word, but it is the best I can think of.
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Susen: Yet, it can be used to describe any performative act, don’t you think?
Holloway: Yes, it can. Marx, as I explained before, chooses to use the concept of “concrete 
labour”, which is not particularly satisfactory either. I suppose we just have to live with the 
fact that we don’t always have adequate conceptual tools to capture the nature of all the 
things we want to describe. Sometimes we have to try and find, or create, those concepts.
Susen: Let’s address another problematic point. From my perspective, one of the weaknesses 
of Crack Capitalism is the socio-ontological idealism upon which its main argument is 
based. In other words, you appear to assume that the “bright” aspects of social life (such 
as cooperation, communication, mutual understanding, democracy, and autonomy) are 
preponderant over the “dark” aspects of our existence (such as competition, rivalry, social 
ranking, envy, and heteronomy). Do you accept that both various “bright” and several “dark” 
dimensions are present, or perhaps even inherent, in human life? If so, do you acknowledge 
that it is somewhat simplistic to reduce the “dark” sides of social existence to the instrumental 
nature of systemic structures, institutions, and capitalism?
Holloway: You may well be right, but, in a sense, we’re taking sides, aren’t we? I’m not 
particularly interested in writing a book which suggests that there is no way out, that there is 
no future, and that evil will dominate―that’s not my thing. What you say, however, may be 
true; it may well be true. Yet, the whole effort of writing the book is to try and demonstrate 
that, in spite of its apparent impossibility, there is still some way out. It’s a question of hope 
against hope. It’s a question of how we find hope in a dark night.
Susen: Reflecting upon the Special Issue on Crack Capitalism, when you look at the articles 
of this collection, would you say that there were perhaps two or three key issues raised in 
the commentaries that made you think “They got it completely wrong!”? Moreover, would 
you concede that there were possibly two or three key aspects that made you think “Wow, 
they have a point, and this is something on which I really need to reflect very carefully in the 
future!”? 
Holloway: Certainly. Yes, there are points which, from my perspective, people got completely 
wrong and, surely, others which make me think they got it absolutely right. Yet, it’s difficult 
to say exactly what, because it requires a long digestion process, doesn’t it?
Susen: Fair enough. The Special Issue on Crack Capitalism was meant to be a constructive 
dialogue between you and your critics, wasn’t it? As you mention in “Variations on Different 
Themes: A Response”14, the concluding piece of this collection of articles, “[o]verwhelmingly, 
the contributions are written with the intention of carrying the debate forward, not for the 
purpose of scoring points”15.
Holloway: Yes, absolutely. That’s what I thought.
Susen: Finally, how about your future? What’s your next major project on the horizon?
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Holloway: Nothing terribly clear for the moment, but I am reflecting upon the meaning of 
crisis. In particular, I am grappling with the question of how we can understand the unity 
of crisis theory and revolutionary theory. So, I guess, the next book will be about how to 
understand the relationship between crisis and revolution.
Susen: Thank you very much for your time, John.
Holloway: Thank you.
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